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Groth: Revolution is No Longer a One State Affair

When the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) began its drive for
Algerian independence, one of its first goals was to “internationalize the
conflict”.1 It was a rather ironic objective considering the international system
had provided the biggest impetus for revolution in Algeria in the first place.
Revolutions are domestic in that they seek to alter the internal political, social,
and economic structures of a territory and are preceded by discontent, agitation,
and other internal factors. However from the 19th century and onward, it has
become impossible for any state to exist in a vacuum. 2 A state is in constant
contact or dialogue, if you will, with the international system, an entity
constituting all actors, states, ideologies, and events outside of a state.
International events influence events within a state which may in turn influence
the international system. For that reason, the international system provides the
single most important group of factors in the lead-up to a revolution: the context.
This paper will explore the significant role of the international system in
creating the framework for revolution through the examination of three case
studies: the Young Turk Revolution (1908), the Algerian Decolonization
Movement (1954-1962), and the Iranian Revolution (1979). Three factors of
revolution will be studied: direct foreign involvement in a state, changes to the
international opportunity structures, and the polarization of the international
sphere. Finally, some brief conclusions regarding the application of these
structures to other Muslim Revolutions will be given.
The first and most evident incursion of the international system into a prerevolutionary state is through direct intervention by foreigners in the state‟s
domestic affairs. This involvement is sometimes military in nature, but more
frequently takes the form of direct or indirect control of certain aspects of state
sovereignty. Although external in nature, this interference provokes extensive
internal backlash within each state, thereby pushing them closer to revolution.
For example, the Ottoman Empire suffered a debt crisis due to excessive spending
on infrastructure and modernization in the years just before its revolution and
threatened to default on its European sponsored loans. Rather than allow the
empire to default, France and Britain took over administration of the debt and
supervision of economic affairs within the empire through the Public Debt
Administration (1881). This move naturally caused considerable internal antiEuropean sentiment especially among the lower classes that bore the brunt of the
1

Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origin of
the Post-Cold War Era, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), Print, 74
2

A state here will refer simply to the political organization of an area of land. It therefore can
refer to modern nation-states like France, Egypt, and Turkey but also to political entities such as
the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, although extensive scholarship has been devoted to studying
the creation of the international system, its origins are beyond the scope and breadth of this paper.
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high taxes and self-serving legislation imposed by the Europeans.3 The
Europeans had also been propping up the “sick man of Europe” for decades
through various techniques including monetary aid and military might to preserve
the balance of power in the international system. It was an effort that was
becoming half-hearted and disjointed by the turn of the century, thereby
destabilizing the empire further in preparation for revolutionary change.4
Algeria, as a French colony, on the other hand, was utterly consumed by
the international system. The lack of sovereignty and citizenship rights and the
domestication practices of the colonists stimulated internal dissent. Although
Algeria was considered a “department” or province of France, the political,
economic, and social privileges of that status were enjoyed chiefly by the noir
(French colonists) and not the native population. The complete economic
exploitation by France of Algeria, a periphery state in the world system, also
fueled intense resentment and violent tendencies in the native population.5
Economics was a central area of foreign intervention in Iran as well, albeit in a
different way. Iran accepted some foreign aid under the Shahs, especially to
finance modernization projects. However, the aid was frequently contingent on
certain economic concessions, international alliances, employment of foreign
advisors in economic and internal affairs, etc… This allowed foreign actors,
especially the U.S. and Soviet Union (U.S.S.R), to steal parts of Iranian
sovereignty to serve their own cold war and economic interests. 6 The strategic
value of Iranian oil was also a considerable international concern. Britain and the
Soviet Union used this rationale to justify Operation Countenance, the full
occupation of Iran‟s oil fields, railways, and other strategic infrastructure and
interference in the Iranian political affairs during World War II. Such concerns
were also at play when Iran terminated oil agreements with the American-Iranian
Oil Company in 1953 and attempted to nationalize the company. Cold War
politics and protection of strategic oil and economic resources were considered
appropriate justification for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
coup d‟état to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq and install the U.S.
3
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Press 2004), Print, 1-21
6

Erin Glade, “Revolution and Islam: Iran,” Revolution and the Emergence of the Modern Muslim
World, Macalester College, 1600 Grand Avenue, St. Paul, MN, 21-30 April, Lectures.

http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macreview/vol1/iss1/2

2

Groth: Revolution is No Longer a One State Affair

aligned Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi. Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi would
rule Iran with considerable U.S. support and financing until Iran‟s revolution in
1979.7
In general foreign intervention in the Ottoman Empire, Algeria, and Iran
siphoned the states‟ economic sovereignty into the hands of foreign governments
and delegitimized domestic government officials as either the puppets of the
international system or foreigners themselves. These grievances, among many,
made revolution an attractive option to many groups during these region‟s
respective revolutions.
The smaller events and trends just mentioned are the embodiment and
result of much larger scale transformations taking place in the international
system. Dramatic destabilization and change to power structures and actors such
as those caused by World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII) in many cases
made the international system more conducive to the outbreak of revolutions in
particular states. For instance, the Young Turk revolution took place during a
“wave” of revolutions during the early 20th century. The Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP), a Young Turk revolutionary organization, most certainly drew
inspiration and tactics from similar constitutional revolutions such as the Japanese
Meiji Restoration, the Russian Revolution of 1905, and the Iranian Revolution of
1906.8 For example, Sati al-Husri (2006), a civil servant in the Ottoman Empire,
made the statement that, “from now on, the „history of Japanese progress‟ will
show us with great clarity what kind of course of action it is necessary for us to
pursue for „true progress,‟” and that, “however backward a nation may remain in
the matter of progress, if it shows a sufficient level of earnestness, … it will be
able to make good the time that it has lost.”9 Successful constitutional revolutions
in other states encouraged the CUP to believe that political change was possible
and perhaps even inevitable within their own state.
In contrast, Algeria‟s revolution emerged out of the rebuilding of the
international system post-WWII. The late 1940‟s were a period of reinvention
and rebuilding of national and state identities, particularly in formerly Germanoccupied-territories such as France. French political and economic hegemony
7

Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Updated Ed, (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2006), Print, 105-131
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Nader Sohrabi, "Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew about Other
Revolutions and Why It Mattered," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44, 1, 2002, 4579, Web, 19 Feb 2010, ArticleFirst, JSTOR, Retrieved at Macalester College,
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3879400>.
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and sense of legitimacy was weak over all its colonies, including Algeria during
this time. Given the instability and anticipation of change that this post-WWII
environment engendered, it was only natural that the FLN saw these conditions as
a window of opportunity in which to execute their revolution. Additionally,
Algeria also had the company of a wave of other decolonization movements in
other colonies. These including its French-occupied neighbors Morocco and
Tunisia, and the breakup of the European-controlled Mandate states in the Middle
East into free nation-states following WWII. The Bandung Conference, a
meeting of developing nations and colonies who wished to remain “unaligned”
with either the United States or Soviet Union during the Cold War, presented
additional openings. The FLN was able to develop friendships with countries less
dependent on Cold War politics for survival, such as Egypt, at the conference.10
Algeria took advantage of the international opportunities offered by the new
international system, along with the fear and sympathies that existed in western
nations still recovering from the calamity that was WWII, to launch its battle for
domestic independence and international solidarity with its colonial compatriots.
Because the Iranian Revolution occurred about two decades after most
other Muslim revolutions, it was much more dependent on the Cold War
international structure and its reactionary movements than its predecessors. After
20 years of American or Soviet style development and the inherent secularization
policies that came with each, many Muslim states were disillusioned with
Western policies of development in general.11 This triggered an Islamic
resurgence in many states including Iran that incorporated narratives of a return to
the “true way” and the reassertion of Islam in political life. This international
system shift, along with an internal economic recession within Iran, provided an
opportune environment for the Iranians to launch their revolution against the Cold
War system, the corrupting influences of the west, and western modernization
policies.12 Some scholars have gone so far as to call the Iranian Revolution a

10
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“clash of civilizations”, between East and West, tradition and modernity, Islam
and Christianity.
Yet this brings up an interesting, but little talked about phenomenon in the
international system and revolution: the polarization and re-polarization of
identities within the system. Normally, one thinks about identities as a pair, one
representing a particular viewpoint and understanding of the world system and the
second, an “other” identity with different and “foreign” viewpoints from the
former. In everyday life, the identity and its “others” are in constant flux,
“continually being constructed and reconstructed through interaction with one
another.”13 However, at some times two identities may become “polarized” and
perceive one another as antagonistic and a threat. As mentioned previously, this
happened with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. identities during the cold war, creating a
bipolar and tension-wrought international system that was partially conducive to
revolution.14 However there are two other identity system struggles that were
strong factors in this paper‟s three case studies, and many other Muslim
revolutions as well.
The first was the colonial identity system, a structure that Frantz Fanon
(2004) described as a “world divided in two.”15 The worldview was centered on
the division of individuals into colonist and native, oppressor and oppressed.
Colonists saw the native “other” as backward, colored, evil heathens needing
western tutelage. On the other hand, the native saw the colonist “other” as violent,
oppressive, threatening to his/her religion and culture, etc…. This system waxed
in the late 19th century with the mad colonial scramble for Africa by the European
powers. The identity system waned during the World Wars when Allied and Axis
identities and conflict were of more importance than colonial issues. Its salience,
though, increased dramatically in the years following WWII, especially when
decolonization was more prevalent. In the Algerian case and in the colonized
world more generally, “otherhood” constituted threat and virulent hatred. If
Frantz Fanon claims are accurate, violence was not only inevitable but necessary
to destroy the polarized system.16 Whatever the truth of his assertion, the
polarization of colonial identity in the international system was vital to creating a
physical and mental enemy which could be fought against.

13

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power
Politics," International Organization 46,2 1992, Web, 2 Mar 2010, JSTOR, Retrieved at
Macalester College, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858, 391-425
14

Alexander Laban Hinton, Why Did They Kill: Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide, (Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2005), Print, 33
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The second system, what I will term the haves and have-nots system, is
more economic and development based. As Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1997), an
ideologue of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, describes in his book Gharbzadegi
(Weststruckness), the international sphere is divided into two groups, Europe and
the West or: those with full stomachs and power, and Iran and the rest of the
world who go hungry and are powerless.17 While this description fits the
disillusionment with modern development mindset of pre-revolutionary Iran, it
also can apply to the Young Turk Revolution. As mentioned previously, Ottoman
territories had enormous debts to western powers leaving the empire poverty
stricken and militarily inferior while the west was rich, modern, and powerful. In
most Muslim revolutions of the 19th and 20th century, there is always a divide;
there is an “us” which is good, civilized, and superior, and a “them” or “other”
which is an enemy of the people and a threat to the survival of the Muslim state.18
In the age of globalization, the line between what is local and what is
international has been blurred beyond recognition. Yet as this study shows, the
border between the international system and the domestic state has been an
obscure yet high activity site in the period leading up to a revolution. The
pilfering of sovereignty, whether through direct colonization, foreign aid decrees,
or developmental “assistance” was a pungent theme across the Young Turk
Revolution, Algerian Decolonization, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. But
even more than these small intrusions, changes to the international structure
bestowed unique and unforeseen opportunities on the revolutionaries.
Polarizations of identity allow revolutions to congeal around common themes,
identities, and enemies even as it heightens tension within the international
system. Although internal factors are important in determining the grievances and
structure of a revolution, it is the international system that gives a Muslim
revolution its passionate willpower, and the “it's us or it's them” mentality and
determine the perfect time in which to strike. It‟s not a few zealous Islamic
fundamentalists that diplomats should be worrying about. It‟s the fact that
“wealth and poverty, power and impotence, knowledge and ignorance, prosperity
and desolation, and civilization and savagery have become polarized in the
world.”19

17

Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi (Weststruckness), Trans. John Green and Ahmad Alizadeh
(Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1997), 12
18
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It‟s not a question of if but of when and to whom the international system
will award its favor and who will be the next target. Revolution and the
international system can be a dangerous combination.
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